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so successful. The crisis which threatened the massive 
development gains in East Asia and the performance of the 
world economy showed that such systems were unsustainable 
and I am pleased to say the arguments of the cynics are now 
completely overtaken.
But for me, worst of all, corruption hurts the poor. The 
eloquence of their anger at petty corruption worldwide shows 
there is no such thing as a culture of corruption.
And if we look at the poorest countries and continents in the 
world, we find terrible poverty side by side with great riches,
with corruption in between. And we see development delayed 
and poverty' linger because massive resources are wasted and 
misused for corrupt purposes. We can and must do better. /%
The Rt Hon Clare Short MP
Vi'fL'/un of State for International Development
Collective rights: the case 
of indigenous peoples
by Alexandra Xanthaki
Pending agreement on a UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Alexandra Xanthaki examines the political theories and research supporting the 
need for recognition of collective identities and rights, which she claims have 
hitherto been overshadowed by the focus on rights of the individual.
I ndigenous expectations for a 'Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' that would include a wide range ot collective rights have sparked lively debates between states, 
indigenous representatives and experts in the United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous 
representatives insist that the individualistic view of the world is 
totally alien to the indigenous ideas of the world, their traditions, 
their past and their present. An exclusive emphasis on individual 
rights has not and cannot give effective guarantees for indigenous 
peoples, who require the simultaneous protection as collectivities 
in order to survive and flourish as distinct peoples and cultures.
Collective rights emphasise the value of protecting indigenous 
cultures and existence per se and reject assimilation and 
integration as valid modes of relating to indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous peoples have stated:
'The concept ojindigenous peoples' collective rights is oj paramount 
importance. It is the establishment of rights of peoples as groups, and 
not merely the recognition of individual rights, which is one of the most 
important purposes of this Declaration. Without this, the Declaration 
cannot adequately protect our most basic interests. This must not be 
compromised.' (emphasis added)
(UN Sub-Commission, Indigenous Peoples Preparatory Meeting: 
Comments on the First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, July 1989.)
In contrast, some states use liberal theory in order to reject 
the notion of collective rights. The French delegate, for example, 
stated in the 1996 Working Group on Indigenous Peoples that 
collective rights did not exist in international human rights law,
o o
and therefore his government had reservations with regard to 
those articles that aimed to establish collective rights. In similar 
fashion, the US explained its rejection of indigenous collective 
rights (in its delegation's comments on s. 1 of the Draft 
Declaration in the 1995 Working Group) on the basis that:
'International instruments generally speak of individual not collective 
rights. ... Making clear that the rights guaranteed are those of 
individuals prevents governments or groups of (sic) violating or 
interfering with them in the name of the greater good of a group or a 
state ... In certain cases, it is entirely appropriate or necessary to refer 
to indigenous communities or groups, in order to reinforce their 
individual civil and political rights on the basis ojfull equality and non- 
discrimination. But characterising a right as belonging to a community, 
or collective, rather than an individual, can be and often is construed to 
limit the exercise of that right (since only a group can invoke it), and 
thus may open the door to the denial of the right to the individual. This 
approach is consistent with the general view of the US, as developed by 
its domestic experience, that the rights of all people are best assured 
when the rights of each person are effectively protected.'
The traditional approach ot liberal rights theory recognises 
only two categories of rights holders: the individual and the
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society. In their historical evolution, human rights have been 
perceived as the rights of individuals against state power. 
Opponents of collective rights base their arguments on 
cosmopolitanism, a theory which advocates for autonomous 
individuals who are free from their cultural tradition and can 
therefore make autonomous decisions, in contrast to the 
communitarian theory according to which the self has 
attachments to the culture he/she has grown up in. Liberals 
argue that the establishment of collective rights will reflect a 
totalitarian vision of the society and will raise tribalist or 
nationalistic attitudes.
The extensive philosophising on the need for cultural 
membership and collective rights is generally perceived by 
international lawyers as very engaging and very relevant to legal 
debates on claims for collective rights; yet, sometimes it appears 
to be lagging behind new developments in international law. If 
international law is defined as the system of rules and principles 
that govern international relations (Martin Dixon, Textbook on 
International Law, 3rd edn, London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 1996, 
2), its normative direction on the issue cannot be ignored.
In this article, I will focus on three elements which form the 
direction international law has taken in the debate on cultural 
membership and collective rights:
  the perception of groups as concentric circles;
  the idea of togetherness in difference; and
  the model of critical pluralism.
GROUPS AS CONCENTRIC CIRCLES
The liberal emphasis on the dichotomy between the individual 
and the state ignores the existence of any intermediate groups. 
The rejection of collective rights derives from a notion of 
'monotheism of the state', namely unlimited sovereignty of the 
state and the view that the state should be the only source of 
authority in each political system. However, this model appears 
to be inconsistent with the existing norms of international law as 
well as the international political realities. In the post-national 
state, although sharing the state's national identity, citizens have 
in most cases other loyalties as well. These loyalties may lie in 
groups smaller than the state, such as families, local 
communities, ethnic, religious and cultural groups, as well as 
groups bigger than the state, such as regional organisations (e.g. 
the European Union) or even the international society. All these 
groups represent a series of multiple loyalties that the individual 
has and consequently incorporate various cultures that influence 
the individual. For example, a Sami who lives in Finland has 
been exposed to the specific culture of his family, the culture of 
his village (which sometimes has a different linguistic dialect), 
the Sami culture, the Finnish culture as well as the European 
culture.
International law is in the process of recognising various sub- 
national groups other than the state. International norms are in 
the process of expanding the number of entities that enjoy legal 
personality   if only for some purposes. Currently, non-state 
entities such as inter-governmental organisations, regional 
organisations, non-self-governing territories, liberation 
movements and insurgent communities, non-governmental 
organisations, corporations and autonomous local 
administrations can act to some extent as agents in the
international arena (see Martin Dixon, op cit, 109 110, and lan 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992, 58-70).
International law goes even further and recognises the 
importance of groups in the life of the individual. The 1989 
UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture 
and Folklore protects the culture of sub-national groups. Also, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child states that education must 
develop respect for the child's 'own cultural identity, language 
and values' as well as for 'the national values of the country in 
which the child is living'. Although the human rights system gives 
the central role to the individual, protection is also given to the 
person as a member of groups, such as the family, ethnic, 
national, religious and linguistic groups and nations (peoples). 
Even though most of these provisions establish individual rights 
or individual rights in collective capacity, their spirit recognises 
the importance of groups for the. individual and prescribes that 
these groups should be protected.
By protecting the various sub-groups that surround the 
individual, it appears that international law perceives these 
groups as forming concentric circles around the person. Apart from 
having his/her own attributes and choices as an independent 
agent, the person is also influenced by his/her immediate group 
(such as the family), peer group (such as the local group), ethnic, 
religious and cultural group, his/her nation" (peoples), state, 
continent/region and, finally, loosely by the main culture we all 
share as citizens of a common world. The closer the circle to the 
person, the more influence it has on him/her. In order to protect 
the individual, all the various 'circles'   loyalties   around 
him/her need to be protected. Thus, international law includes 
a different set of protection for the individual (by establishing 
individual rights), but also his/her family, ethnic, cultural or 
religious group, the society he/she lives in, and finally the culture 
of his/her continent and the culture of the world itself (by 
establishing collective rights) (see Ronald Caret, 'Communality 
and Existence: The Rights of Groups', 56 (1993) South California 
Law Review, 1001  1050). As Waldron argues (in Jeremy 
Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative' 
25 (1995) University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 751--793, 
as reprinted in Will Kymlicka (ed), The Rights of Minority Cultures, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, 93-119, 103):
'Just as the allegedly self-made individual needs to be brought to a 
proper awareness of[h\s/]her dependence on social, communal and 
cultural structures, so too in the modern world particular cultures and 
national communities have an obligation to recognise their dependence 
on the wider social, political, international and civilisational structures 
that sustain them.'
The illustration of the self and its various cultural 
memberships as concentric circles seems to represent an 
accurate and viable perception of the link between the person, 
non-state groups and society. It follows the communitarian 
approach on the importance of cultural frameworks, but it is 
liberated from the trap of 'one culture'. It recognises that more 
than one culture can play a valuable role in the individual's 
choices; it accepts that in the post-national world individuals can 
have several loyalties without them being opposing or dangerous 
to national unity and it indicates the interplay that exists among 
cultures.
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Personalism
This approach has also been upheld by personalism. 
Personalists consider the individualistic tradition and the 
communitarian approach to be complementary rather than 
contrasting. According to the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
personalism is defined as:
'[a] philosophical perspective or system for which person is the 
ontological ultimate and Jor which personality is thus the fundamental 
explanatory principle.'
Personalists regard the 'person' as an essential part of the 
community, as distinct from the 'individual', who is regarded as 
an isolated entity (Virginia A Leary, "Postliberal strands in 
Western Human Rights Theory" in Abdullah Ahmed An-Nam 
(ed), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives. A Quest Jor 
Consensus, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, 
105-132, 108). The term 'person' or 'personality' implies 
relationships with others in the community and a corresponding 
link with the community and the relations between persons and 
society. Personalists believe that a person is inseparable from the 
context of the world and of others. The person lives in 
community with others and not as an isolated individual; thus, 
personalists support the establishment of community7 rights, 
particularly for communities smaller than the state. However, 
personalists do not ignore the negative consequences of group 
membership; thus, rights exist to counteract the tyranny of the 
state as well as the tyranny of groups and they can be claimed 
against the state as well as groups. The personalist perspective of 
rights offers a western conception of human rights which is not 
constrained to individual rights.
The model of personalism appears to be a viable model for 
indigenous peoples and the recognition of their rights. The 
Indian Crees, for example, share the culture of their reservation, 
the culture of the overlapping American Indian community' and 
they also share characteristics of the Canadian culture; they also 
feel part of the North American culture as well as members of 
the international community'. Their lives and choices represent a 
mixture of characteristics of these cultures and they want to 
preserve and protect all of these characteristics. Their collective 
rights will protect them from the states and the other groups; 
their individual rights will protect them against all authorities,
including the indigenous one. In this spirit, the establishment ofo o r '
collective rights for indigenous peoples seems trouble-free.
PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE
'The concept of indigenous peoples' collective rights is of paramount 
importance. It is the establishment of rights of peoples as groups, and 
not merely the recognition of individual rights, which is one of the most 
important purposes of this Declaration'.
Existing provisions
'Collective rights' does not constitute a new area for
o
international law. The existing norms protect various aspects of 
groups. For example, art. 1 and 2 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide enumerates those 
acts which constitute genocide 'when intended to destroy, in 
whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial and religious group'.
Moreover, art. 1 (4) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination rejects the term racial discrimination for 
special measures that are adopted for the sole purpose of 
securing adequate advancement of certain ethnic groups. Also, 
the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice establishes 
the responsibility of the state to protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on an equal footing for individuals and 
groups. The various instruments on minorities, such as art. 27 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the UN Declaration on Minorities also protect groups. More 
recently, various collective rights have been established per se, 
such as the right to self-determination, the right to development, 
the right to peace, the right to co-ownership of the common 
heritage of mankind, the right to a healthy environment and   
most relevant to our discussion   the right to preserve one's 
cultural identity. (For example, the UNESCO Declaration on Race 
and Racial Prejudice proclaims that 'all individuals and groups have 
the right to be different'.)
Potential conflict?
Still, even though group rights complement individual rights, 
there are certain cases where there is a conflict between 
collective and individual rights. The question is: which one will 
prevail in cases of conflict? Eiberals tried to find a way for the 
adjudication of all these rights by giving a narrow interpretation 
to collective rights and by regarding them, as much as possible, 
as individual rights collectively pursued   and whenever that was 
not possible to rank them far behind the individual rights. This 
line of thought is manifested in the establishment of minority 
rights in international law as individual rights under collective 
capacity', rather than collective rights (thus minority- rights are 
recognised as individual rights that can be exercised 'in 
community with others'; see, e.g. the UN Declaration on Ethnic, 
National, Religious or Linguistic Minorities and art. 27 of the 
ICCPR).
It seems that establishing a general rule of hierarchy of rights 
would be counter-productive. Caret (op cit) argues that any 
framework of accommodation of individual and collective rights 
would violate the principle of non-derivation among the three 
elements of a human being, namely personhood, communality 
and sociality. William Pertney explicitly rejects any hierarchy 
between collective and individual rights, although his general 
interpretative principles to facilitate their co-existence imply a 
prevalence of individual rights: firstly, 'the particular collectivity 
must not be impaired in its capacity to continue either by the 
State or by claims on behalf of individuals'; and secondly, 'a 
particular collectivity must respect the maximum individual 
rights consonant with the preservation of the group' (W F 
Pertney, The Aboriginal Rights Provisions in the Constitution Act, 
Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1987, 52, as quoted in Darlene 
Johnston (Kymlicka (ed)) Johnston notes that:
' ... in light of the potential diversity of group claims, it might be 
premature to attempt to construct a generalised framework for their 
adjudication'.
If community is seen as a constituent of individual identity, 
then enhancing collective rights need not diminish individual 
rights. By recognising the importance of sub-national groups, 
international law seems to emphasise the circumstances of 
mutual reinforcement between groups. Gutmann adopts an
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integrationist approach and comments that it may be possible 'to 
find ways in which local communities and democracy can be 
vitalised without violating individual rights' (Amy Gutmann, 
'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', 14 (1985) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 308 330). Johnston argues that 'collective and 
individual interests are not ... inevitably antagonistic. The 
supposed antithesis seems to be based on a particular and 
intolerant conception of the nature of group rights.'
International law also seems to oppose a pre-determined 
hierarchy among rights. Conflicts between rights is a common 
phenomenon of the legal profession. Any conflicts between 
rights, principles and norms are generally solved on an ad hoc 
basis, after taking into account various considerations. In 
possible conflicts between a collective and an individual right, 
the same process would be used.
Kymlicka opposes this process and accepts interference in the 
minorities' cultures when the individual rights of the memberso
of the groups are violated (Will Kymlicka, 'The Rights of 
Minority Cultures, Reply to Kukathas', 20 (1992) 1 Political 
Theory, 140 145, 144). However, this interference is not clear- 
cut. He suggests many criteria that will determine the prevalence 
of the individual right, including:o ' o
' ... the severity of discrimination within the community, the extent 
of division within the community, the existence of any treaty obligations, 
the nature of the proposed interference, and so forth. For example, there 
is a large difference between coercively imposing liberalism and offering 
various incentives for liberal reforms. '
Kymlicka favours a search for agreement on fundamental 
principles. In any case, the two cultures will have to find a modus 
vivendi. Hence, il a minority culture is non-liberal:
' ... liberals inside the culture will seek to promote their liberal 
principles through reason or example, and liberals outside would lend 
their support to any efforts the community makes to liberalise their 
culture. '
TOGETHERNESS IN DIFFERENCE
The 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International 
Cultural Co-operation declares that:
"... in their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal 
influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part of the 
common heritage belonging to all mankind. '
According to the declaration, cultural co-operation is a right 
and a duty for all peoples and nations. All nations must respect 
the distinctive character ol each culture, while promoting their 
enrichment in an atmosphere of friendship and peace. Cultural 
co-operation aims at the mutual benefit of all the nations 
practising it and should be exercised in a spirit of broad 
reciprocity. Both the Council of Europe Framework Convention on 
National Minorities and the Organisation for Security and Co- 
operation in Europe (OSCE) Copenhagen Document re-assert the 
spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue, mutual respect and 
understanding that should exist among the minorities and the 
majority. The idea of reciprocity among cultures is emphasised 
in the following comment of the UN Committee on Human 
Rights in relation to the protection of cultural rights:
'The protection of these rights is directed to ensure the survival and 
continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity oj
the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a 
whole.' (emphasis added)
International law adopts a multicultural policy in relation to 
the various groups and their cultures, namely a policy that leads 
to equality among the groups and equal treatment. Through the 
celebration of difference or diversity, international law has 
fostered a constructionalist approach to culture, namely a view 
of culture as a relational concept: there can be no act of 
identification that does not already entail an act of 
differentiation (M Schulte-Tenckhoff, 'The right of persons 
belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture', working 
paper for the 1997 UN Working Group on Minorities). 
However, differentiation is not viewed as exclusion. All the 
groups understand themselves as participants in the same society, 
subject to interaction, exchange and inter-dependency. The 
interaction sometimes causes friction and conflicts that are 
resolved following institutions and procedures of discussion that 
all participants have accepted as legitimately binding. These 
groups are heterogeneous, and have a differentiated place in 
public life. Young calls this model 'the heterogeneous public' 
(Iris Marion Young, 'Together in Difference: Transforming the 
Eogic of Group Political Conflict' in Will Kymlicka (ed), The 
Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford: OUR 1995, 155-178, 157).
International law seems to approve the connection between 
the various groups that Young calls 'togetherness in difference'. 
Although Young is primarily interested in social groups, her 
approach seems verv relevant to cultural groups. Various groups 
are seen as:
' ... overlapping, as constituted in relation to one another and thus, 
as shifting their attributes and needs in accordance with what relations 
are salient. In my view, this relational conception of difference as 
conceptual helps make more apparent both the necessity and possibility 
of political togetherness in difference.'
In her model, Young suggests a conception of difference that 
better recognises the heterogeneity- and diffusion of groups   a 
more fluid and explicitly relational conception of difference:
'In this conception, difference does not mean otherness, or exclusive 
opposition, but rather specificity, variation, heterogeneity. Difference 
names relations of both similarity and dissimilarity that can be reduced 
neither to coextensive identity nor overlapping otherness. Different groups 
potentially share some attributes, experiences or goals. Their differences 
will be more or less salient depending on the groups compared and the 
purposes of the comparison. The characteristics that make one group 
specific and the borders that distinguish it from other groups are always 
undecidable.'
Young's approach recognises that multiculturalism within the 
state is valuable and that all cultures are important for the 
development of the individual and the society in general. 
Cultures are not only permitted, but even assigned to have an 
input in the cultural life of the state and, in turn, the state 
guarantees group-related rights and policies. Cultures are not 
seen as contrasting, but as overlapping; differences are seen as 
'variations' and are not ignored, but celebrated. Young's model 
indicates that apart from the cultures that form concentric 
circles, there are other cultures involved in the forming and 
development of the individual in a parallel way. It is thus viable 
in a multinational society' to have the same amount of loyalty to 
two ethnic groups or two cultural groups.
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CRITICAL PLURALISM
UNESCO, which includes 186 member states, is dedicated to 
the development of international intellectual co-operation. The 
recent UNESCO World Commission on Culture and 
Development report entitled 'Our Creative Diversity' (chap. II, 
p. 70) emphasises the importance of cultural pluralism and 
political democracy. The report states that:
' ... the challenge today ... is to develop a setting that ensures that 
development is integrative and that there are best practice institutions 
built on genuine commitment to being inclusive'.
Multiculturalism can exist only in a pluralistic society, where an 
array of choices and opportunities would maintain a marketplace 
of goods, ideas, cultural and political options. In this context, 
individuals that are not hopelessly dependent on specific cultural 
attachments will be able to make their own choices. This 
framework can be found in a pluralistic society, that is, advocated 
by cosmopolitans (Michael McDonald, 'Should Communities 
,Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism' in 4 (1991) 2 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 217 237, 224).
Pluralism is viewed by many states as the main challenge to the 
state's sovereignty. (Michael Walzer, "Pluralism: A Political 
Perspective" in Will Kymlicka (ed)). The two concepts (pluralism 
and state sovereignty) are perceived as opposing and challenging. 
In the post-national state, these perceptions are inconsistent with 
reality. In fact, the recent events in former Yugoslavia indicate that 
pluralism may be the only way of maintaining a state's sovereignty. 
If the state denies its multicultural character, its citizens will 
inevitably feel dissatisfied and oppressed. As seen in the context 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, oppressed 
groups are likely to revolt and try to undermine the state's 
sovereignty. In contrast, if pluralism and sovereignty are viewed as 
supplementing principles of this new order, collective rights will 
be recognised in the cultural groups of the state (pluralism) and 
the state can maintain its role as a decision maker, the manager of 
the various activities (sovereignty).
Adeno Addis makes the distinction between two forms of 
pluralism: paternalistic pluralism and critical pluralism. In 
paternalistic pluralism, minorities are viewed as the 'others' and 
their rights are protected as a means to 'save' them from the 
majority In this model, the minorities themselves do not engage 
in a dialogue about their rights, because they are seen as unable 
to do so. It is the enlightened majority that decides how to 'save' 
them. Evident examples of this policy have been the policies of 
many governments towards indigenous peoples (Adeno Addis, 
'Individualism, Communitarianism and the Rights of Ethnic7 o
Minorities', in 67 (1992) Notre Dame Law Review, 615-676, 620).
Unlike paternalistic pluralism, critical pluralism views 
minorities as partners in the creation or recreation of the society. 
The state actively engages in a dialogue with minorities in order 
to find the best way and resources to make minority cultures 
flourish. Moreover, the state creates institutions that enable the 
rest of the population to open itself up to all groups, by 
accepting them all as dialogue partners. Critical pluralism also 
believes in multiplicity: groups are seen as 'contingent rather 
than essential' and their very meaning can be moulded and re- 
shaped through dialogue.
The idea of critical pluralism is realised through the various 
provisions on participation of minority groups in the decision-
making process of the society they live in. The UN Declaration on 
Minorities proclaims that members of minorities have the right to 
participate effectively in decisions at the national and, where 
appropriate, regional level. In particular, the ILO Convention 
(169) concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries 
adopts a broad concept of participation in relation to indigenous 
peoples: states should not only consult indigenous peoples on 
matters which affect them directly; the consultations must be 
undertaken with the objective of achieving agreement or consent 
to the proposed measures.
In the dialogue process, groups are conceived as equal 
partners rather than negotiators or imitators of the dominant 
groups. The critically pluralist society7 does not transcend group 
differences; cultures are not surpassed but acknowledged and 
celebrated. Institutional dialogue is very important, because it 
leads to the re-evaluation Kymlicka argues for; groups are 
involved in mutual corrective engagements. Groups are re- 
conceptualised and re-cast and their differences are adjusted and 
reconstituted in a process ol constant and genuine dialogue. 
Through dialogue, groups are challenged to accommodate in 
their own world the objective reality of the other. They interact, 
exchange ideas and benefit from the cultures of all the groups 
rather than just from their own culture exclusively. As Falk notes 
(in Richard Falk, 'Cultural Foundations for the International 
Protection of Human Rights', A A An-Na'im (ed), Human Pjghts 
in Cross-Cultural Perspectives, A Quest jor Consensus, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, 43-64, 48):
'One role of the robust society is to overcome both normative and 
cultural blindness to human suffering. The raising of awareness requires 
deliberate efforts to counterpart the vulnerability of previously excluded 
groups; lessening mlnerability in turn depends on developing 
decentralised participator}'democracy. ... Demoralisation is both a vital 
precondition and a crucial ingredient oj human rights protection.'
CONCLUSIONS
The concepts of concentric loyalties, togetherness in 
difference and critical pluralism appear to be supported by the 
existing norms of international law. These concepts form the 
basis for the equal co-existence of collective rights with 
individual rights and combine the essence of liberalism with 
collective rights. If indigenous communities are accepted and 
recognised as bearers of rights and duties, there is a greater 
chance to develop a coherent set of doctrines to accommodate 
their real problems and concerns. The inclusion of a wide range 
of collective rights in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples will render affirmative action for 
these communities easier, and indigenous nations that haveo
suffered discrimination for so long will eventually be 
compensated. /»
Alexandra Xanthaki
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This article is based on a paper presented in an earlier version at the 
World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy held at 
Pace University, New York, from 24 to 30 June 1999. The author is 
grateful to Professor P Thornberry, C Stefanou and R W Race for 
their comments.
11
Amicus Curias Issue 25 March 2000
